Political Institutions in East Timor: Semi-Presidentialism and Democratisation by Lydia M. Beuman

Author:Lydia M. Beuman [Beuman, Lydia M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Ethnic Studies, Social Science, Political Science, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781317362128
Google: 8GCFCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2016-02-05T12:23:05+00:00

Proclamatory powers

In addition to Gusmão’s intervention in the legislative domain and in the appointment and dismissal process, President Gusmão made use of his power to address messages to the national parliament and the country (Section 86e) and express his opinion about the government’s policies in press statements.

The president and the prime minister frequently disagreed on issues related to foreign policy and, in particular, East Timor’s relationship with Indonesia. President Gusmão and Prime Minister Alkatiri were divided over how to deal with Indonesian officers and Timorese pro-Indonesian militias who were involved in the 1999 atrocities before, during and after the UN-run ballot on independence (see Chapter 3). Whereas Gusmão favoured a ‘forgive-and-forget’ policy, Alkatiri took a much tougher stance. In an interview the prime minister declared that he did not share the president’s view that Indonesian officials who had committed human rights violations in East Timor should not be tried. ‘I am for reforming things justly, since justice is our bridge to reform. I think the amnesty is important, but after achieving justice and after everybody gets his right from the person who wronged him. Justice comes first’ (Al-Hayat, 2002). Gusmão, for his part, believed that his approach was necessary to maintain the unity of East Timor. Community building, according to him, was the key to restoring East Timor’s shattered social structure, and trials would only discount the value of the sacrifices made for freedom. The president said that he believed in justice but not in revenge (Birnbauer, 2003).

One specific point on which the president and the prime minister disagreed concerned the payment of war reparations from and to Indonesia. In 2001, Gusmão announced that he forgave Indonesia and would not seek reparation payments from Jakarta, which brought him on a collision course with the FRETILIN leadership, who insisted that Jakarta should pay for the damage caused by its forces. Whereas Alkatiri during his time as prime minister refrained from demanding war reparations, it was Indonesia that insisted it still held assets worth more than Rp 1 trillion (US$1.3 billion) in East Timor, including destroyed government buildings that had been built with foreign loans. The prime minister categorically stated that he would reject any claims for compensation made by Indonesians. The president disagreed with him. In an interview with the Portuguese news agency Lusa, Gusmão argued that Alkatiri’s statements ‘need to be avoided’ and instead called for dialogue with Indonesia (Lusa, 2002a).

Another difference of opinion came to light after Indonesia’s ad hoc human rights court decided to acquit four Indonesian army officers and a policeman over one of the worst massacres in East Timor. During the Suai massacre on 6 September 1999, some 200 people were killed. The prime minister considered ‘the whole process a farce’ (Moore et al., 2002). President Gusmão, for his part, was merely concerned that Abílio Soares – the only Timorese who was convicted by the Jakarta court of crimes against humanity – would be seen as the sole culprit. Some days before the verdict, Gusmão wrote a letter to the court in which he pleaded for clemency.

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